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ERECTING NEW CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM  
POST-ARAB SPRING 
John Liolos* 
Abstract: Constitutions contain two types of elements: functional and as-
pirational. The functional elements establish the institutions that com-
prise the state and the pragmatic rules of governance—the “constitution 
in practice.” Aspirational elements articulate the nation’s commitment to 
the higher principles and ideals it seeks to attain. In a well-ordered state, a 
constitution’s aspirational elements provide the true north for the na-
tion’s compass, and the functional elements adequately pursue those 
ends. If the functional components of a constitution cannot or do not ad-
equately pursue the nation’s stated aspirations, the constitution, the gov-
ernment, and the rule of law are in jeopardy. The recent upheaval in the 
Middle East, known as the Arab Spring, provided three nations (thus far) 
with the opportunity to erect new constitutional cultures: Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Libya. For these countries, adequately concretizing revolutionary as-
pirations in their new national constitutions, while also providing func-
tional elements and institutions to reinforce these aspirations, is vital to 
establish secure and legitimate constitutional orders. This Note explores 
these ideas of constitutional theory universally and applies them to the 
particular situations in these Arab Spring nations. 
Introduction 
 A paramount task of a democratic nation’s constitution is to effec-
tively prescribe the supreme law of the land derived from the consent 
of the governed.1 A constitution seeks to fulfill important legal func-
tions, including organizing political power within a state, establishing 
 
* John Liolos is an Executive Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. The author expresses gratitude to all those persons, living and de-
ceased, who dedicated themselves to that most noble of human aspirations: rational self-
governance. 
1 See Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 89, 97 (1988). 
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government institutions, and providing administrable laws.2 A constitu-
tion, and its surrounding culture of constitutionalism, is often also a 
statement of a nation’s commitment to the ideals it values most highly 
and aspires to attain.3 A constitution contains two types of elements: 
functional and aspirational.4 The functional elements of a constitution 
establish the institutions that comprise the state and the pragmatic 
rules of governance—the “constitution in practice.”5 Aspirational ele-
ments, by contrast, articulate the nation’s commitment to higher prin-
ciples, such as social justice or democracy.6 In short, aspirations mani-
fest the national ideals at the time they are realized.7 In a well-ordered 
state, the aspirational aims of a constitution provide the true north for 
the nation’s compass and determine policies the functional provisions 
should implement to achieve the legitimacy of the laws and promote a 
perpetually progressing society.8 If the functional components of a con-
                                                                                                                      
 
2 See, e.g., Surya Deva, The Constitution of China: What Purpose Does It (Not) Serve?, 2 Jin-
dal Global L. Rev. 55, 59 (2011); F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of 
the Supreme Court, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 645, 663 (2009) (noting that the gap between a constitu-
tion in theory and a constitution in practice is driven by administrability); see also Vicki C. 
Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and Constitution-Making, 49 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1249, 1254 (2008) (“Constitutionalism entails a sufficiently shared willing-
ness to use law rather than force to resolve disagreements; to limit government power and 
to protect human rights through law and defined processes; to provide a reasonable de-
gree of predictability and stability of law that people may rely on as they structure their 
lives; and to maintain a government that is legitimate and effective enough to maintain 
order, promote the public good, and control private violence and exploitation.”). 
3 See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 49 (1992) (“Writing a 
constitutional text offers an opportunity for a victorious movement to make a collective 
effort both to frame their fundamental principles and to mobilize broad popular support 
for their crucial initiatives.”). 
4 See Richard Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, 31 Dalhousie L.J. 1, 36 (2008); Daryl J. 
Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. 
L. Rev. 657, 698 (2011); Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the 
Rule of Law, 16 Fla. J. Int’l L. 115, 116 (2004). 
5 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 4, at 36–37 (“[T]he pragmatic model [of constitutional-
ism] creates manageable expectations of rights within the rule of law . . . .”); Levinson, 
supra note 4, at 700 (quoting Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Con-
stitutions 38–47 (2009)); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and 
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 924 (2006) (providing examples of 
constitutional text prescribing rules and limitations for organs of government); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 103 (2010) 
(“Various political institutions implement constitutional provisions . . . .”). 
6 See Albert, supra note 4, at 36. 
7 See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1631, 1634–
35 (2009). 
8 See Levinson, supra note 4, at 663; J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: 
And Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 245, 256 (1999); see also, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (presenting an example of a 
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stitution cannot adequately pursue its aspirational goals, the constitu-
tion and government will lose support and lack legitimacy.9 Such a dis-
connect could result in social strife and political unrest.10 
 The recent upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, popu-
larly known as the Arab Spring, has resulted in three nations toppling 
their old regimes thus far.11 In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the overthrow 
of the former governments provided the opportunity not only to draft 
a new constitution, but also to cement the revolution by framing consti-
tutional principles in a way to mobilize broad support.12 These upris-
ings were organic movements comprised of frustrated citizens demon-
strating against their tyrannical governments for freedom, greater 
representation, and economic opportunity.13 Often, frustrations arose 
when the functional provisions in the former constitutions did not ef-
fectively implement some express aspirational commitments, contribut-
ing to social unrest and constitutional hypocrisy.14 Now that the people 
of these nations have successfully overthrown their governments, the 
question remains whether they can create constitutions that successfully 
                                                                                                                      
constitution providing an institution with the power to fulfill an aspiration); Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, On the Social Contract 171 (Donald A. Cress trans., 1987) (“What makes 
the Constitution of a state truly solid and lasting is that proprieties are observed with such 
fidelity that the natural relations and the laws are always in agreement on the same points, 
and that the latter serve only to assure, accompany and rectify them.”) 
9 Cf. Levinson, supra note 4, at 678 (providing an example of disenfranchised masses 
pressuring elites for political reform with the threat of revolution); Dankwart A. Rustow, 
Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in Transitions to Democracy 14, 19 
(Lisa Anderson ed., 1999) (discussing the importance of observing social and economic 
conditions when considering a political state). 
10 Cf. Dorf, supra note 7, at 1639 (“Entrenched structural rules also can preserve de-
mocracy against prospective tyrants.”); Levinson, supra note 4, at 663 (concluding that 
government institutions risk subversion if they are not relatively stable). 
11 Betsy Hiel, Arab Spring Uprisings Have Now Toppled Three Governments, Pittsburgh Trib.-
Rev. (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_763372.html. 
12 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 49, 53 (describing the advantages of creating a con-
stitution during the period immediately following revolution when societies are amenable 
to constitutional change). 
13 See Mohamed Younis & Ahmed Younis, Opinion Briefing: Egyptians on the Arab Spring, 
Gallup (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/152879/Opinion-Briefing-Egyptians- 
Arab-Spring.aspx; Arab Spring Is Human Awakening, TwoCircles.net (Feb. 15, 2012, 8:42 
PM), http://twocircles.net/2012feb15/arab_spring_human_awakening.html. 
14 Cf. Albert, supra note 4, at 36–37 (noting that the constitutional text should render 
aspirations practically achievable); Levinson, supra note 4, at 663, 678 (providing an exam-
ple of disenfranchised masses pressuring elites for political reform with the threat of revo-
lution). Compare Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, arts. 47, 48, 11 Sept. 
1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, available at http://www. 
constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf (granting freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press), with Younis & Younis, supra note 13 (articulating that inspirations 
for the Arab Spring included freedom of expression). 
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incorporate the people’s aspirations to capitalize on their revolutionary 
moment.15 Entrenching some central revolutionary aspirations in the 
new constitution is necessary to preserve the progress made before the 
galvanizing effects of revolutionary fervor recede to the constitutional 
inertia of ordinary times.16 To adequately pursue the revolutionary 
goals, political actors must ensconce these aims into their new constitu-
tions as practically achievable aspirations.17 
 Part I of this Note provides a background on the Arab Spring revo-
lutions, past areas of the relevant nations’ constitutional hypocrisy, and 
their present constitutional situations. Part II discusses a key difference 
between a true revolution and mere coup, invoking Dankwart A. Rus-
tow’s model for democratic transition to situate the current movements. 
It also highlights particular constitutional tensions that must be resolved 
going forward, namely the role of Sharia law, the developing democracy, 
and human rights protections. Part III analyzes these tensions in rela-
tion to the new national constitutions, and articulates the components 
of constitutional aspirations capable of adequately addressing these and 
other similar struggles in order to establish a legitimate and lasting de-
mocratic constitution. The Note concludes by articulating some univer-
sal criteria for aspirations, and summarizing its contribution to constitu-
tional theory both in the abstract, as well as in the particular context of 
the Arab Spring. 
I. Background 
A. Tunisia 
 The Arab Spring ostensibly began in Tunisia on December 17, 
2010, when a street vendor lit himself ablaze in a desperate act of frus-
tration with the country’s economic and political condition.18 This act 
galvanized many Tunisians of similar sentiment into political action and 
protest against President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, demanding 
                                                                                                                      
15 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3, 49, 53; Hiel, supra note 11; see also Alexis de Toc-
queville, Democracy in America 239 ( J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) 
(1835) (“There can be no doubt that the moment when political rights are granted to a 
people who have till then been deprived of them is a time of crisis, a crisis which is often 
necessary but always dangerous.”). 
16 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 49, 53. 
17 See id.; Dorf, supra note 7, at 1634–35. 
18 Julian Borger, Crackdown Threat in Tunisia After Graduate Protests, Guardian (Lon-
don), Dec. 30, 2010, at 22; Robert F. Worth, How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 23, 2011, at WK4. 
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economic, political, and social change.19 As the protest movements 
grew, President Ben Ali responded with force and offers of political 
concessions in order to preserve the regime.20 
 Ben Ali originally assumed power in a bloodless 1987 coup 
d’état.21 Because he gained power in a succession that was technically 
constitutional, his government ostensibly retained the Tunisian Consti-
tution of 1957.22 Over the course of his rule, however, Ben Ali did not 
implement certain constitutional promises effectively in practice.23 For 
example, Article 8 of the contemporaneous Tunisian Constitution pro-
tected the freedoms of speech and press, Article 5 protected certain 
human rights and human dignity, and Article 12 forbade arbitrary de-
tentions.24 Yet throughout his rule, Ben Ali had a long record of hu-
man rights violations, such as arbitrary detentions, stifling of the press, 
and other such authoritarian behavior violating Tunisia’s constitutional 
provisions.25 Thus, his government as a functional entity failed to give 
force to many of the express aspirational commitments of the Tunisian 
Constitution.26 Such constitutional failings and quashing of human 
rights contributed to the building strife that surfaced in the 2011 Arab 
Spring protests with calls for true change.27 The pressure from Arab 
Spring protestors ultimately proved overwhelming, and Ben Ali dis-
                                                                                                                      
19 Yasmine Ryan, Tunisia’s Bitter Cyberwar, Al Jazeera ( Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.al 
jazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/20111614145839362.html. 
20 See Borger, supra note 18. 
21 See Emma C. Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bour-
guiba to Ben Ali 77–78 (1999) (describing the events leading to Ben Ali’s assumption of 
power). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. at 217–20 (providing examples of Ben Ali acting contrary to constitutional 
provisions); Ryan, supra note 19 (noting the Ben Ali regime censored the press and hin-
dered free expression). 
24 Const. of Tunis., 25 July 1957, ch. 1, arts. 5, 8, 12, available at http://confinder. 
richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf. 
25 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 217–20; Ryan, supra note 19; Two International Organiza-
tions Protest Ongoing Harassment of Tunisian Journalist, Hum. Rts. Watch (Apr. 5, 2000), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/04/04/two-international-organizations-protest-ongoing- 
harassment-tunisian-journalist [hereinafter Organizations Protest Ongoing Harassment]. 
26 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 220; cf. Albert, supra note 4, at 36–37 (noting that the 
constitutional text should render aspirations practically achievable); Levinson, supra note 
4, at 663, 678 (providing an example of disenfranchised masses pressuring elites for politi-
cal reform with the threat of revolution). 
27 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 220; Worth, supra note 18; Younis & Younis, supra note 
13. 
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solved his government, relinquished his power on January 14, 2011, 
and subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia.28 
                                                                                                                     
 Though protests initially continued over the presence of Ben Ali 
supporters and party members’ sustained involvement in the govern-
ment, the interim government made a concerted effort to move toward 
democracy and the establishment of a new constitution.29 In October 
2011, Tunisians voted to establish an assembly that would draft a new 
constitution and form a new government in the first elections since 
Ben Ali’s demise.30 This assembly has the opportunity to entrench key 
aspirations of the revolutionary period into the new national constitu-
tion, and thereby truly break from the old regime and fulfill the poten-
tial of the revolutionary moment.31 
B. Egypt 
 The revolutionary fervor that began in Tunisia quickly spread to 
Egypt as a political awakening began to grip the wider Arab world.32 In-
spired by the success of Tunisian revolutionaries, Egyptians with similar 
grievances took to the streets against their government and its leader, 
Hosni Mubarak.33 
 Mubarak, sitting as vice president in 1981, assumed power constitu-
tionally when President Anwar el-Sadat was assassinated by militants.34 
Though Mubarak’s government officially held authority under the 
Egyptian Constitution of 1971, his government failed to implement 
many of the constitutional commitments present in the text.35 
Throughout his rule, Mubarak relied heavily on repressing political sen-
 
28 Tunisia: Ex-President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia, BBC News ( Jan. 15, 2011, 2:08 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12198106. 
29 See Tunisia Interim Leaders Dissolve Secret Police Agency, BBC News (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:11 
ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12669461; Tunisian Prime Minister Resigns amid 
Renewed Protests, CNN (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:15 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/ 
africa/02/27/tunisia.government/. 
30 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisians Vote in a Milestone of Arab Change, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
24, 2011, at A1. 
31 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 5–6, 49; Albert, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
32 Ishaan Tharoor, Top Ten World-News Stories: The Arab Spring Blooms in Tunisia and Egypt, 
Time (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,210134 
4_2101368_2101659,00.html. 
33 Id. 
34 Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt 196 
(2011). 
35 Compare Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, art. 3 (“Sovereignty is for 
the people alone; they are the source of authority.”), with Blaydes, supra note 34, at 164–
66 (describing Mubarak’s regime frustrating free elections). 
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timent and maintaining a “permanent state of emergency” to assert au-
thoritarian control.36 
 Attempting to maintain his regime amid the growing 2011 pro-
tests, Mubarak made political concessions and promised reforms.37 Yet 
he simultaneously utilized the military to police protests, and manipu-
lated access to the internet and social media websites that were driving 
the revolution.38 There was even speculation he may have ordered sol-
diers to fire on peaceful protestors, or at least remained complicit in 
the killings.39 The revolutionaries would not be deterred, however, and 
Mubarak finally ceded power on February 11, 2011.40 
 After Mubarak relinquished power, the Egyptian military assumed 
control of the nation, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) governed.41 SCAF worked to establish order following the pro-
tests and fall of Mubarak, and pledged to meet “the legitimate demands 
of the people for a true democratic environment.”42 It accordingly es-
tablished a timetable for elections and the transition to a more democ-
ratic government.43 
 Despite SCAF’s pledges, however, many Egyptians felt the transi-
tion to democracy was not sufficiently expedient, and thus continued to 
protest against the military’s control of government.44 On November 
                                                                                                                      
36 Dina Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict, and 
Cooperation 33–34 (2010). 
37 See generally Alexandra Dunn, Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s 
January 25 Uprising, Fletcher F. World Aff., Summer 2011, at 15 (providing an account 
of Mubarak’s manipulation of Egyptian media during the uprising); Anthony Shadid, 
Obama Urges Faster Shift of Power in Egypt, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2011, at A1 (describing Muba-
rak promises for political concessions and reforms). 
38 See sources cited supra note 37. 
39 See Egypt’s Military Ruler Denies Order to Shoot, Al Jazeera (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/10/2011102233119313815.html. Egyptian authorities 
later convicted Mubarak of complicity in the killing of protestors during the uprising, and 
was sentenced to life in prison. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Despite Life Sentence, Mixed Mubarak 
Verdict Brings Turmoil to Egypt, N.Y. Times, June, 3, 2012, at A1. 
40 See Hosni Mubarak Resigns as President, Al Jazeera (Feb. 11, 2011, 16:39 GMT), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html. 
41 Heather Murdock, Mubarak’s Resignation Sparks New Day for Egypt: “He’s Gone!,” Wash. 
Times, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/11/crowds-rejoice- 
egypts-mubarak-steps-down/. 
42 Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: Statements and Key Leaders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/20110210-
egypt-supreme-council.html?ref=middleeast. 
43 See David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Hones Warnings to Egypt as Military 
Stalls Transition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2011, at A1. 
44 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign as Protests Rage, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 22, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign]. 
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22, 2011, the military announced that it had struck a deal with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, an influential political party, to speed the transition 
to civilian rule, with a presidential election to be held by late June 2012; 
but this still did not abate the public’s demands for the military to leave 
power.45 Some viewed the military council as acting with the same dis-
regard for civilian demands as Mubarak had in his attempt to maintain 
power nine months earlier, and as seeking to palliate unrest through 
false promises of a slow transition to democracy.46 Indeed, after meet-
ing with the military rulers, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter stated 
that he doubted SCAF would “fully submit to the authority” of the 
planned civilian democratic government.47 Subsequently, Mohamed 
Morsi was democratically elected President on June 30, 2012, and has 
worked to gain power by forcing some generals into retirement, but 
SCAF continues to maintain a presence in the government’s affairs.48 
 Although Egypt has a provisional constitution and has made some 
progress toward democracy, there is still much to be done.49 If the mili-
tary does not abide by its promises, it risks perpetuating the similar hy-
pocrisies of the previous regime.50 Further, the revolutionary fervor 
could subside before the revolutionary aspirations are adequately en-
trenched in a new legitimate constitution.51 Thus, Egypt’s future will 
rest heavily on the ability of its new constitutional drafters to cement 
the revolutionary aspirations into its new constitutional culture.52 
                                                                                                                      
 
45 David D. Kirkpatrick, Deal to Hasten Transition in Egypt Is Jeered at Protests, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 23, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Deal to Hasten Transition]. 
46 See US Urges Quick Transition to Democracy in Egypt, Boston.com (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2011/11/25/us_urges_quick_
transition_to_democracy_in_egypt/. 
47 David D. Kirkpatrick, Carter Says Egypt’s Military Is Likely to Retain Some Political Powers, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2012, at A14 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Egypt’s Military Likely to Retain 
Powers]; Ashraf Fahim & Sherine El Madany, Carter Says Egypt Army Unlikely to Give Up All 
Powers, Reuters ( Jan. 12, 2011, 6:58 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/ 
us-egypt-usa-carter-idUSTRE80B1YM20120112. 
48 See Kareem Fahim, Egyptian Leader Pushes Generals Into Retirement, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 
2012, at A1. 
49 See Constitutional Declaration 2011, Egypt’s Gov’t Service Portal, http://www. 
egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/Constitution/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Constitu-
tional Declaration 2011 (Egypt)]; see also, e.g., Kirkpatrick, Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign, 
supra note 44 (demonstrating unresolved violence, uncertainty and political tumult); Fa-
him & El Madany, supra note 47 (showing the difficulty posed by military power). 
50 See Fahim & El Madany, supra note 47; Shadid, supra note 37. 
51 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 49, 53. 
52 See id. Egypt has since adopted a new constitution by referendum, signed into law by 
sitting President Morsi on December 26, 2012. See Salma Abdelaziz, Morsy Signs Egypt’s Con-
stitution Into Law, CNN (Dec. 26, 2012, 15:28 GMT), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/25/ 
world/africa/egypt-constitution/index.html. Although it is early to offer a full analysis, there 
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C. Libya 
 The political discontent that began in Tunisia and continued in 
Egypt eventually spread to Libya by February 2011.53 Similar to the pro-
testors in the other two nations, Libyans took to the streets in search of 
greater economic opportunities and political freedoms.54 Libyan ruler 
Muammar Gaddafi responded to the uprising like Ben Ali and Muba-
rak, with both threats and actual use of the military to quell protes-
tors.55 Unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, who both realized the strength of 
the tide against them and accepted the need to step down, Gaddafi de-
fiantly imbedded his government through the use of force.56 
                                                                                                                      
are many critics of the constitution and it appears to succumb to several different challenges 
discussed in this Note’s inquiry. See Shahira Amin, Amid Orthodox Christmas, Egypt’s Christians 
Fear for Their Rights Under Islamist Government, CNN ( Jan. 7, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://religion. 
blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/07/amid-orthodox-christmas-egypts-christians- fear-for-their-rights-
under-islamist-government/; Cynthia Schneider, U.S. Gets It Wrong on Egypt Again, CNN ( Jan. 
25, 2013, 16:07 GMT), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/opinion/schneider-egypt/index. 
html. For instance, some dissenters argue the constitution, in addition to other defects, is not 
a product of national consensus and was disproportionately influenced by Islamist parties. See 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Despite “Mistakes,” Morsi Says Constitution Fight Was Democracy in Action, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2012, at A8; David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitu-
tion Despite Objections, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2012, at A6. Other commentators argue the mili-
tary retains much of its power. David D. Kirkpatrick & Mayy El Sheikh, Egypt Opposition Gears 
Up After Constitution Passes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2012, at A10. Some also note that the consti-
tution does not adequately address the role of Islamic law, but merely adopts Islamic law and 
leaves the particulars to the political process. David D. Kirkpatrick, A Vague Role for Religion in 
Egyptian Draft Constitution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2012, at A4. In the wake of the new constitu-
tion, Egypt’s citizens remain unsatisfied and the country suffers continued unrest. See Tarek 
El-Tablawy & Salma El Wardany, Mursi Declares Emergency in 3 Egyptian Provinces amid Unrest, 
Bloomberg (Jan. 28, 2013, 2:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-27/egypt-
s-mursi-declares-state-of-emergency-amid-mounting-unrest.html. 
53 See Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 145, 157–58, 162–63 (2012); Egypt-Inspired Protests Spread to Libya, CBS News 
(Feb. 16, 2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/16/501364/main200 
32155.shtml. 
54 See Ibrahim Sharqieh, The March for Freedom in Libya, Brookings, (Feb. 22, 2011, 
11:47 AM) http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/02/22-libya-sharqieh. 
55 See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Prosecutor’s Ap-
plication Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶¶ 2, 12, 14, 17, 20, 27 (May 16, 2011), http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor’s Warrant Applica-
tion for the Situation in Libya]. The spelling of Muammar Gaddafi’s name varies widely 
among publications; the spelling throughout this piece remains consistent with the ICC 
warrant. See id. 
56 See David D. Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Forces Strike with Fury as Unrest 
Grows, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2011, at A1. 
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 Gaddafi gained power in a bloodless coup in 1969.57 As head of 
the Revolutionary Command Council, Gaddafi continued to assert his 
power until he consolidated his control over Libya by 1971.58 Gaddafi’s 
revolutionary manifesto, the Green Book, detailed his social and political 
philosophies, thereby articulating the aspirations for his state.59 While 
the Quran was officially the supreme law of the land in name, Gaddafi’s 
personal will operated as such in practice.60 Throughout his rule, Gad-
dafi repressed and even executed some of his own people, stifling free-
doms and germinating the strife that ultimately led to the Arab Spring 
protests.61 
 When the protests erupted in 2011, rather than address the peo-
ple’s demands, Gaddafi allegedly ordered the systematic use of force 
against the protesters, resulting in violent clashes and civilian deaths.62 
Gaddafi’s violent crackdown then inspired protestors to take up arms, 
and a violent civil war ensued.63 As the government continued to as-
sault civilians, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution 
authorizing a no-fly zone to protect the Libyan people,64 and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization intervened to implement it.65 With the aid 
of the no-fly zone, the Libyan rebels fought a grueling civil war.66 They 
                                                                                                                      
57 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya 79 (2006). 
58 See id. at 82; see also George Tremlett, Gadaffi: The Desert Mystic 145–50 
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Hand Man, Guardian (London), Feb. 23, 2011, at 5. 
62 Prosecutor’s Warrant Application for the Situation in Libya, supra note 55, ¶ 2. 
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U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
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ya’s Civil War, Guardian (London), Apr. 1, 2011, at 33. 
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ultimately emerged victorious, capturing Tripoli in late August and kill-
ing Gaddafi on October 20, 2011.67 
 Following Gaddafi’s fall, Libya subsequently began its transition to 
democracy.68 The temporary National Transitional Council (NTC), 
which ruled during the civil war, held successful elections in July 2012 
for a national assembly that must establish a constitutional assembly to 
draft a new national constitution.69 As in Tunisia and Egypt, there is 
still much work to be done in Libya.70 For instance, many of the revolu-
tionary militias refuse to give up their arms in an effort to influence 
political decisions as self-proclaimed “guardians of the revolution.”71 
Thus, just as in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyans have the opportunity to de-
sign a functioning constitution and to progress to a thriving state, but 
they must adequately discern common national aspirations and design 
them in a manner that is practically achievable.72 
                                                                                                                     
II. Discussion 
A. True Revolution? 
 A revolution is defined as “a fundamental change in political or-
ganization” and “a fundamental change in the way of thinking about or 
visualizing something: a change of paradigm.”73 Conceptualizing a rev-
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uk/news/article-2054344/Gaddafi-dead-Mob-killers-trial-vow-Libyas-new-rulers.html. 
68 Libya’s Transitional Leader Declares Liberation of His Nation, Toledo Blade (Oct. 23, 
2011), http://www.toledoblade.com/World/2011/10/23/Autopsy-shows-Gadhafi-killed-by-
head-shot-official-says. 
69 See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
2, 2011, at A4 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution]; Libya’s Election, 
N.Y. Times, July 10, 2012, at A20. 
70 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Fate of Dictator Places Focus on Arab Spring’s ‘Hard Road,’ N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 21, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Arab Spring’s Hard Road] (describing 
the “hard road ahead” for these nations); Libya’s Election, supra note 69; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 29–31, 47–50. 
71 Kirkpatrick, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution, supra note 69. 
72 See Albert, supra note 4, at 31–33 (recognizing the importance of the state’s eco-
nomic ability to achieve aspirations); Rustow, supra note 9, at 34 (“The transition to de-
mocracy . . . may require some common attitudes . . . on the part of the politician and of 
the common citizen.”). 
73 Merriam-Webster 1068 (11th ed. 2012); see Samuel P. Huntington, Political 
Order in Changing Societies 264 (1968) (“A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and 
violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political insti-
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olution as a fundamental shift in the political paradigm is helpful in 
attempting to understand the aspirations of many of the Arab Spring 
protesters and activists.74 Rather than a continuation of the status quo, 
or a simple legal revolution that establishes a new source of laws but 
may not achieve a revolutionary break from the old regime,75 the in-
tention of the Arab Spring movement remains revolutionary by defini-
tion.76 In the past, some Arab leaders and intellectuals tried to legiti-
mize the abandonment of democracy and individual freedoms by 
arguing that autocratic regimes were necessary to strengthen economic 
development and national sovereignty.77 This argument resonated with 
prior regimes, but the Arab Spring demonstrates the people deemed 
the need for repressive autocracy has passed.78 The focus of the Arab 
Spring was to break from these tyrannical political paradigms of the 
past and concretize a revolution with greater democracy, economic op-
portunity, and personal freedom in a new state.79 
 A coup d’état, in contrast to revolution, is defined as “a sudden 
decisive exercise of force in politics; especially: the violent overthrow or 
alteration of an existing government by a small group.”80 In a coup, 
there is no fundamental change in the political paradigm.81 Coups usu-
ally constitute a mere change in the regime and source of legal sover-
eignty, without structural changes to the legal system or the social and 
economic elements accompanying a full-fledged revolution that estab-
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lishes a new constitutional order.82 Though the citizens of Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya have successfully deposed their former rulers, the full 
spectrum of revolutionary change may remain elusive.83 If the revolu-
tionary aspirations of the Arab Spring are not captured and imple-
mented in the subsequent legal order, all of their efforts could amount 
to a mere coup, without the fundamental changes originally sought.84 
 Central to achieving this fundamental paradigm shift that breaks 
from the past regimes’ failings and achieves the goals of revolution is 
the need to establish a legitimate constitution.85 In order to do so, each 
nation must come to some consensus about its identity and aspirational 
goals to mobilize the broad support necessary to articulate these aims 
in the constitution and implement them in society, thereby achieving 
stability and the rule of law.86 Indeed, one scholar notes that “[d]emoc-
ratization is held back in the Arab world by the unresolved conflict over 
collective identity.”87 Thus, one important element for the success of 
the Arab Spring revolutions is to achieve widespread consensus on the 
aspirational aims of the nation to effectively support and implement 
them functionally and thereby attain lasting stability and constitutional 
order.88 
 It may be the case after a period of revolution, that the revolution-
aries with the aspirational visions which originally sparked the uprising 
are not the only interest group holding power.89 Indeed, in Egypt, the 
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military, and not the protestors, assumed power after Mubarak stood 
down.90 Following the regime changes in Libya and Tunisia, the ruling 
councils did contain civilian members; nevertheless, they were still 
comprised of social and political elites.91 These groups of political lead-
ers will negotiate and compromise over the aspirational aims of their 
entire respective nations, thereby influencing the character of the new 
constitutions.92 The ideals and concerns of these post-revolution lead-
ers, however, often differ from aspirations central to the revolutionary 
protestors who began the movement.93 For the nations to achieve true 
revolution and establish themselves on a path to stability and progress 
with broad popular support, these leaders must arrive at aspirational 
aims that their nations can identify with—aims that are not dispropor-
tionately oriented toward the leaders’ own personal concerns.94 If they 
fail to do so, they risk wasting the potential of the Arab Spring’s revolu-
tionary moment through either the perpetuation of past failures, or 
drafting new constitutions without accurate national aspirations.95 The 
people of these nations did not defy guns and bullets for a mere coup 
d’état—or even a legal revolution that simply changes the source of the 
laws—but rather for tangible change and true democracy.96 The pro-
testors of the Arab Spring aspire to full national revolutions that break 
from the past regimes; arriving at accurate consensus about the na-
tions’ aspirational goals is paramount in this endeavor.97 
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B. A Model for Democratic Transition 
 One of the Arab Spring revolutionaries’ primary goals was to es-
tablish governments that are more democratic, representative, and re-
sponsive to the concerns of the citizenry.98 The Arab Spring nations 
have taken strides in this direction, but more must be done to forge 
stable and lasting democratic institutions and cultures.99 In order to 
break from the past regimes and achieve the goals of revolution in the 
momentum of the revolutionary moment, the current political actors 
must establish well-written constitutions.100 Establishing well-written 
constitutions and corresponding constitutional cultures with clear, at-
tainable aspirations and institutions oriented toward those goals is an 
important component of increased democratization.101 
 To more fully understand the burgeoning democratic and consti-
tutional developments in the Arab World, it is helpful to invoke re-
nowned political theorist and sociologist Dankwart A. Rustow’s model 
of democratic transition.102 Rustow’s revolutionary model of democ-
ratic transition identifies a background precondition and three subse-
quent phases deemed integral to establishing a lasting democracy.103 
Within this model, there is arguably a key moment for national consen-
sus on aspirational constitutional aims wherein a constitution may suc-
ceed.104 Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are currently situated in the midst of 
this transition, and identifying their aspirations and instituting them at 
the proper time is central to the success of their democratic experi-
ment, as the model demonstrates.105 
 The first stage in Rustow’s model of democratic transition is the 
necessary background condition of national unity.106 Rustow asserts 
that, “no minimal level of economic development or social differentia-
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tion is necessary as a prerequisite to democracy.”107 Thus, although 
economic and social factors may contribute to democratic transition, a 
pervasive sense of national unity is the only necessary prerequisite to 
begin the transition.108 Signs of national unity are present in the Arab 
Spring nations, suggesting that Rustow’s model may be applicable.109 
Expectedly, there are some dissenters, such as those seeking autonomy 
in eastern Libya.110 Yet Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya all survived the tumult 
of political revolution intact and are moving toward new governments 
with some sense of national unity.111 The fact that these three nations 
survived political crises and emerged whole is itself a testament to na-
tional sentiment.112 
 The second stage in Rustow’s model is the preparatory phase.113 In 
this phase of democratic transition, factions advocating conflicting ide-
als emerge and battle over both their principles and political control of 
the institutions of government.114 Rustow acknowledges that the groups 
that comprise these competing factions may vary greatly from nation to 
nation.115 In the context of the Arab Spring, a clear battle emerged be-
tween the ruling elite and a mobilized citizenry seeking greater free-
dom, economic opportunity, and true change.116 The battle of the pre-
paratory phase poses danger to the democratic transition, as Rustow 
acknowledges that the protagonists may grow weary and the issues may 
fade without the emergence of a lasting democratic solution.117 This 
danger may affect the Arab Spring, particularly with the military pres-
ence in Egypt, but there are significant domestic and international 
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pressures intent on continuing the push toward democracy.118 The 
preparatory struggle of democratic transition is well underway in these 
three nations, and may have passed its apex.119 
 The third and most critical phase to aspirational constitutional 
consensus is the decision phase.120 In this phase, political actors make 
the conscious decision to institute democracy and shape the future of 
the state in accordance with national consensus.121 This is the vital pe-
riod where aspirational constitutional values are discerned, articulated, 
entrenched in a constitution, and hopefully inculcated in the institu-
tions of government.122 It is evident that universal consensus on aspira-
tional aims is practically impossible, and that dissenting factions will 
remain present in any nation.123 In fact, in order to make revolutionary 
aspirations politically and practically achievable, many of them may 
need to be mitigated to an extent.124 Nevertheless, achieving consensus 
on the nation’s aspirational aims to mobilize support and implement 
these goals is vital to the success of the democratic constitution and 
should take place during the decision phase.125 By successfully articulat-
ing an aspirational vision for the state, mobilizing support for that vi-
sion, and orienting government to achieve it, these fledgling democra-
cies can create and maintain stability for decades to come.126 
 The revolutionary quest for political and social stability cements in 
the final stage: the habituation phase.127 The central component of this 
phase is that both citizens and political actors become familiar with, 
and habituated to, democratic government.128 Though there will cer-
tainly be backlash to the democratic process of problem solving—which 
entails compromise and less-than-perfect results for all parties—citizens 
must become familiar with and accept this method of political com-
promise during habituation.129 Once this widespread acceptance of 
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democratic norms takes place, the democracy should be solidified and 
the transition to stable democracy complete.130 
 For the fledgling democracy to ossify into a stable and lasting state 
during this final phase, however, the established government must be 
able to effectively implement the aspirational constitutional elements in 
practice.131 If the people are adversely affected by a vast disconnect be-
tween constitutional aspirations and their functional reality, there will 
undoubtedly be civil strife and government instability, as many will not 
accept the government’s legitimacy.132 Thus, it is essential for the func-
tional constitutional elements to be adequately oriented toward attain-
able aspirations for democracy to flourish and citizens to become ha-
bituated.133 
 As it presently stands, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya seem to be nearing 
the end of the preparatory phase and moving into the decision phase, 
taking concrete steps toward democracy.134 Though nations will de-
velop at differing paces and in different directions, the Arab Spring 
nations are commonly faced with the challenge and promise of drafting 
a new constitution to cement true change.135 As Rustow’s model dem-
onstrates, arriving at some consensus and then moving toward func-
tional implementation of this consensus during the habituation phase 
is central to cementing a revolution and developing a stable democ-
racy.136 
C. Aspirational Flashpoints 
 In discerning the aspirational ideals for the new constitutions and 
the future of the Arab Spring nations, the people must grapple with 
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certain divisive issues.137 Some troublesome issues are reminiscent of 
the constitutional hypocrisies of the past regimes, such as adequately 
fulfilling constitutional promises to protect political and human rights, 
or the military’s role in government.138 Other issues concern normative 
societal values that must be addressed within a larger political system 
that may contain contradictory norms, such as the place of Islamic law 
in democracy and the protection of women’s rights.139 To successfully 
transition to a thriving democracy, each nation must address these chal-
lenges by reaching consensus on accurate definitions for their constitu-
tional aspirations.140 
1. Protecting Human Rights 
 One potential aspirational issue for these nations in their constitu-
tional transitions is the protection of human rights, as these nations 
have each had difficulty protecting human rights in the past.141 Despite 
prior constitutional aspirations to the contrary,142 the former regimes 
had a history of repressing their citizens’ speech and political activity, 
drawing criticism from human rights groups for treatment of civilians, 
and even using deadly force against unarmed civilian protestors.143 Re-
specting basic human rights and political freedoms in practice was a 
source of difficulty for these nations, and was clearly a failed constitu-
tional aspiration.144 
 In their new constitutional declarations, these nations have the 
clear intent to protect human rights through due process of law.145 For 
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example, the new Egyptian Constitutional Declaration declares that the 
“life of citizens has a special sanctity protected by law,”146 and contains 
various articles that safeguard human rights in a variety of ways, such as 
by barring unwarranted or undignified detention, and by protecting 
freedom of religion and assembly.147 The Libyan Constitutional Decla-
ration states that “[h]uman rights and . . . freedoms shall be respected 
by the State,”148 and provides numerous other provisions with detailed 
protections.149 
 Nevertheless, problems in implementing effective and meaningful 
protections for these rights are already emerging.150 In Libya, the NTC 
has faced difficulty protecting loyalist prisoners—and even Gaddafi 
himself—from abuse, torture, and murder.151 Though the NTC is work-
ing to address these issues both domestically and with international aid, 
protection of basic human rights remains an important aspirational 
commitment to achieve in a new Libya.152 Egypt faces similar issues, 
with allegations of human rights abuses against peaceful protestors by 
the ruling SCAF.153 Thus, these nations face the challenge of imple-
menting their constitutional human rights aspirations.154 
2. Democratic Legitimacy 
 Along similar lines, these nations face the challenge of providing 
the democratic legitimacy that was a clear demand of Arab Spring pro-
testors and was subsequently promised in the constitutional declara-
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tions.155 For constitutionally legitimate decision-making to occur, these 
countries must be able to implement the democratic aspirations of 
their constitutional declarations.156 For instance, the Libyan constitu-
tional declaration states that “Libya is an independent Democratic State 
wherein the people are the source of powers,” and that the nation will 
be governed by a democratic regime.157 Currently, however, the largely 
unelected NTC wields power, and some decisions are influenced by vio-
lent militias and armed gangs, not primarily by the rule of a democratic 
majority.158 
 Egypt faces similar problems implementing its new constitutional 
commitment to democracy: though constitutional provisions assert it is 
a democratic government, the military council refuses to fully relin-
quish power.159 Egypt has a long history of military involvement in gov-
ernment; even Mubarak assumed power after extremist members of the 
military assassinated the prior president.160 Article 3 of Egypt’s Consti-
tutional Declaration proclaims that “[s]overeignty is from the people 
only, and the people are the source of authority.”161 Further, Article 53 
states that “[t]he armed forces are the property of the people.”162 
Though there have been steps toward democracy in Egypt, the primary 
locus of power remains in undemocratic hands, and the military refuses 
to cede power as promised.163 Tunisia has proved somewhat more suc-
cessful at instituting democratic control of the government with elec-
tions hailed as legitimate.164 Regardless of their differing success so far, 
the Arab Spring nations must similarly implement their democratic as-
pirations in their coming constitutional processes.165 
                                                                                                                      
155 See, e.g., Libya Const. Declaration 2011, supra note 145, pmbl.; Deshmukh, supra 
note 96. 
156 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 69; Albert, supra note 4, at 32–33. 
157 Libya Const. Declaration 2011, supra note 145, arts. 1, 4. 
158 See Moni Basu, Libyans Face Tough Challenges in Building a New Nation, CNN ( Jan. 26, 
2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/26/world/africa/libya-challenges/index.html. 
159 See Constitutional Declaration 2011 (Egypt), supra note 49, art. 3; Kirkpatrick, Deal to 
Hasten Transition, supra note 45. 
160 See Blaydes, supra note 34, at 18–20 (describing the military’s influence in Egyptian 
politics); Sadat Assassins Are Executed, Glasgow Herald, Apr. 16, 1982, at 4. 
161 Constitutional Declaration 2011 (Egypt), supra note 49, art. 3. 
162 Id. art. 53. 
163 See Kirkpatrick, Deal to Hasten Transition, supra note 45. 
164 See Polls Open in First-Ever Legitimate Tunisian Elections, Telegraph (Austl.) (Oct. 23, 
2011), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/breaking-news/polls-open-in-first-ever-legiti 
mate- tunisian-elections/story-e6freuyi-1226174451783. 
165 See Deshmukh, supra note 96; see also Ackerman, supra note 3, at 69; Albert, supra 
note 4, at 32–33. 
240 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:219 
3. The Place of Islamic Law in the New Orders 
 Another notable flashpoint is the place of Islamic law in the new 
constitutional order and its relationship with liberal principles and secu-
larism.166 In both their past constitutions and present declarations, these 
nations articulate the importance of Islamic law in their constitutional 
orders.167 For instance, both the Libyan and Egyptian interim constitu-
tions state that Sharia is the principle source of legislation.168 Further, 
recent elections in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate widespread support 
for political parties touting Islam’s role in state affairs.169 There are also 
significant segments of the populations that support secularism and lib-
eral social values, such as women’s rights.170 But how do these aspira-
tions comport with, and contradict, Islamic law?171 
 There is no established single body of accepted Islamic law, and 
the term itself is somewhat a misnomer.172 Sharia, which means divine 
law or God’s law, is often referred to as Islamic law and is a system of 
rules that God intended for humans, recorded in the Quran.173 Schol-
ars interpret the Quran through a process called ijtihad, literally trans-
lated “exertion,” to produce legal doctrine called fiqh.174 By their very 
nature, religious texts are subject to interpretations that often differ, 
and scholars’ differing interpretations result in differing schools of 
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Sharia.175 Thus, there are many different interpretations of Islamic law 
that a nation may adopt as its aspirational ideal.176 
 Some interpretations of Sharia values are inherently hostile to lib-
eral secular values.177 For example, some interpretations hold that “one 
female is not legally sufficient to act as a witness in a court of law while 
one male is sufficient.”178 In the past, both Egypt and Tunisia expressed 
reservations to a non-binding international agreement that mandated 
equal rights for women in the realm of marriage and family relations, 
stating that they would not support measures that conflict with Islam’s 
status as the official state religion.179 Further, some interpretations of 
Sharia required death by stoning as a punishment for petty crimes.180 
These and other similar interpretations of Sharia appear irreconcilable 
with modern liberal notions of human rights and secular culture, which 
some factions in these nations endorse.181 
 Nevertheless, some interpretations of Sharia remain compatible 
with liberal values.182 Indeed, under Mubarak, the Islamist parties and 
secular parties worked together at times in pursuit of democracy 
against the authoritarian regime.183 Some interpretations are also more 
supportive of women’s rights, differentiating between the patriarchal 
social structure of many Arab nations that tends to demean women and 
Sharia itself, believing that Sharia alone upholds women’s rights and 
their dignity.184 Thus, it is arguably possible to incorporate interpreta-
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tions of Islamic law that both respect the Quran and provide the toler-
ance sought by secularists.185 
 Though it is clear that these nations value Islamic law by its inclu-
sion in the provisional constitutions, they must decide the form of the 
law they choose to adopt and implement in their new constitutions.186 
Past interpretations of the Quran are not considered wholly immutable, 
and the Quran itself discourages blindly following practices of past 
generations.187 The Quran holds each nation and each generation re-
sponsible for its own beliefs.188 With both the ability and imperative to 
interpret the place of Islam in their nations, the Arab Spring constitu-
tion-makers must agree upon aspirations that incorporate the Islamist 
population’s wishes, while still respecting other citizens’ desires to pro-
tect secular, liberal values.189 Given Islamic law’s widespread impact, the 
constitutional drafters must address its role in the new states in order to 
move to an era of democratic stability.190 
 These aspirational flashpoints of human rights and legal process, 
the role of democracy and military power, and the place of Islamic law 
are by no means an exhaustive list of controversial issues facing these 
three nations’ constitutional development.191 Yet, they are important to 
highlight as examples of the challenges facing these nations that must 
be addressed in the coming constitutional moment.192 The next Part 
will highlight some important criteria to consider when attempting to 
address these and other aspirational flashpoints. 
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III. Analysis 
A. Criteria for Aspirations 
 As illustrated above, constitutional drafters must address numerous 
concerns.193 To adequately fulfill the potential of the revolutionary 
moment and establish a constitution that will serve as the bedrock 
foundation of ensuing social progress, the constitutional drafters must 
carefully craft the provisions they choose.194 There are many criteria to 
consider when drafting constitutional provisions, including whether as-
pirations reflect the nation’s collective identity.195 Also, new provisions 
must be practically achievable in order to promote the rule of law.196 
                                                                                                                     
1. New Constitutions Must Reflect Collective National Identity 
 The aspirations the post-Arab Spring drafters seek to include in the 
new national constitutions should truly reflect the collective national 
identities of their respective nations.197 As Rustow’s model demon-
strates, a conscious choice with at least minimal consensus over the form 
of the future state is essential.198 Nevertheless, the constitutional drafters 
themselves are likely to be comprised primarily of social, economic, and 
political elites with interests that are not always directly aligned with the 
majority of the nation.199 For instance, elites could craft a constitution 
that cements their economic and social power to the detriment of the 
rest of the population.200 In this way, the economic and social elites that 
may have been influential in the past regime may be positioned to per-
petuate some constitutional failures and repugnant policies of the past 
regime, effectively maintaining their unjust dominance.201 
 
193 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 3, at 46–68 (providing examples of prior constitu-
tional moments and issues nations needed to address); Kirkpatrick, Deal to Hasten Transi-
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(discussing the political elite confronting important national issues). 
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 Examples of the strife resulting from political minorities dominat-
ing majorities are currently present within the Arab world.202 In Syria, 
for example, Sunni Muslims constitute the vast majority of the popula-
tion,203 but President Bashar al-Assad, a member of the Alawite minor-
ity, violently maintains his authoritarian regime.204 Syria is currently 
experiencing an armed rebellion that has escalated to full–fledged civil 
war.205 Further, al-Assad’s regime has perpetuated numerous humani-
tarian crises, including using the military to target civilians.206 Achiev-
ing a political solution is difficult, however, because many of the Alawite 
regime’s supporters are Alawite themselves and fear Sunni retribution 
if they cede power.207 The Alawite support contributes to a corrupt re-
gime clinging to power and the resulting violent suppression of the up-
rising.208 Such political domination and resulting instability may be 
avoided in other nations by drafting constitutions that frame funda-
mental principles in a way that mobilizes broad support.209 
 Instituting national aspirations that do not reflect the people’s de-
sires and that continue constitutional hypocrisy runs the risk of per-
petuating the unrest and social strife that contributed to the Arab 
Spring in the first place.210 These revolutions were inspired in part by 
the lack of democratic participation in the respective governments 
dominated by the will of autocrats.211 Failing to fulfill these revolution-
ary aspirations by providing for democracy may perpetuate social strife, 
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as shown in Egypt.212 Egyptians remain discontented because the SCAF 
fails to fulfill its promises to fully cede power and institute democratic 
reforms.213 Thus, constitutional drafters must incorporate collectively 
identified aspirations from the very heart of the revolutionary move-
ment in order to promote true change, satisfy the discontented popu-
lace, and provide the blueprint for social stability and progress.214 
2. New Constitutional Norms Must Be Attainable to Promote the Rule 
of Law 
 In order to promote the rule of law essential to a constitutional so-
ciety, the aspirations included in the new constitution must be practi-
cally achievable.215 If an aspiration is included because it is morally ad-
mirable, but nonetheless unattainable and unenforceable, it can 
undermine the very rule of law and the promises of written constitu-
tionalism.216 Overly aspirational provisions—such as guaranteeing health 
care to all citizens when the state lacks the economic resources to deliver 
it—attempt to articulate a noble future vision of society, but, as a conse-
quence, may commit the state to unachievable contemporary aspira-
tions.217 Discrete negative rights such as criminal due process concerns 
limiting state power may be effectively implemented with some effort 
and moderate state resources, but an affirmative economic grant of an 
aspiration like universal health care is another consideration entirely.218 
 The Constitution of Poland, for example, guarantees extensive 
economic rights to its citizens, including the right to a minimum wage, 
employment, health care, education, housing, and a healthy environ-
ment among others.219 The constitutions of Uzbekistan and Belarus 
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guarantee similar aspirational rights, including paid vacation, health 
care, and a good standard of living.220 These guaranteed rights, though 
noble aspirations, are unattainable for all citizens in practice given the 
limited resources of the states.221 By enshrining a largely unattainable 
aspirational right into the national constitution and subsequently fail-
ing to provide it consistently in practice, these nations have enabled 
their citizens to call into question the efficacy of other provisions, which 
undermines the very promise of constitutionalism.222 
 Nevertheless, the post-Arab Spring drafters should not aim too low 
in their aspirations, as “[a] constitution is a window into the soul of the 
citizenry.”223 Indeed, an aspiration is a goal to aspire to and a model to 
achieve.224 Thus, the provisions must strike a balance between driving 
the state to a higher level of national achievement and remaining at-
tainable enough to support the nation’s budding culture of constitu-
tionalism.225 
 This is a difficult balance to strike, as placing limits on constitu-
tional aspirations can contradict their very essence: an ideal state of 
being to achieve in the future.226 Nevertheless, drafters should avoid 
overly broad and practically unattainable aspirations, so that the law 
can be enforced as written.227 As stated above, this may draw the effi-
cacy and legitimacy of the entire constitution into doubt.228 
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 One problem with unattainable aspirational commitments is the 
use of broad language.229 Broad provisions like those discussed above 
in Poland and Belarus can be difficult to define and implement.230 The 
meaning of constitutional provisions can differ from person to per-
son.231 To be sure, national courts have been tasked with legally defin-
ing constitutional provisions, yet their definitions remain unsatisfactory 
in some cases.232 Thus, entrenching broad provisions that may be unat-
tainable in practice can frustrate the purpose of constitutionalism.233 
The Arab Spring nations are better served by appropriately narrowing 
the scope of their aspirational commitments so that they still drive their 
societies in the direction envisaged by citizens and concretized in their 
constitutions, but not too far that they remain unattainable and un-
dermine constitutionalism itself.234 
B. Functional Institutions 
 Once the language of the aspirational provisions is chosen, these 
aspirations remain merely words on a page if they are without institu-
tions to implement and enforce their goals.235 For this reason, the con-
stitution must also establish institutions in order to achieve some of the 
aspirational commitments in reality.236 
 As the form of the constitution reflects national identity, the gov-
ernment it creates should be defined and chosen by the people them-
selves, with some consensus.237 Nevertheless, the institutions must be 
able to implement the aspirational ideals and commitments of the na-
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tion, or unattainable aspirations may undermine the promise of consti-
tutionalism.238 
 For example, in all three Arab Spring nations, there were past con-
stitutional commitments that remained unfulfilled.239 As articulated, 
constitutional commitments, such as the previous Tunisian constitu-
tion’s protections for human rights and human dignity, were not ade-
quately maintained by the functional elements that the constitution 
established.240 Ben Ali, acting as President, was able to usurp enough 
power to implement policies contrary to these constitutional aspira-
tions.241 
 Therefore, the drafters of the new national constitution must em-
ploy functional provisions that establish institutions capable of imple-
menting the express aspirational commitments in the constitution; the 
institutions also must sufficiently be checked to limit the possibility of 
concentrated power and its related tyranny.242 In order to mobilize 
broad support for constitutional aims, the choice of the form of institu-
tions must invariably be left to the people, as with other important de-
cisions on collective identity.243 Nevertheless, the people’s institutional 
design must be effective or otherwise risk undermining their own aspi-
rations and the entire constitutional project.244 
C. Pitfalls to Avoid 
 In designing the post-Arab Spring constitutions, there are certain 
difficult considerations that must be addressed in the drafting process, 
such as the role of Islamic law and the extent of democratic participa-
tion, described previously.245 Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya must adequately 
address such divisive and problematic areas to achieve a workable con-
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sensus in their constitutional process that lies between imposed uni-
formity and implacable hostility.246 Without instituting policies that rep-
resent consensus and that mobilize broad support, the efficacy of the 
constitutions and the states’ probabilities of stability are in jeopardy.247 
 Though somewhat anachronistic and culturally removed, the issue 
of slavery in the United States presents an illustrative example of the 
detriments of avoiding difficult issues in the constitutional drafting 
process.248 When the Philadelphia convention met in 1787, its dele-
gates reached lasting compromise on many issues,249 but the issue of 
slavery remained divisive.250 The delegates did reach a number of com-
promises on the issue, such as calculating slaves as three-fifths of a per-
son for representation purposes and preventing abolition of the slave 
trade until 1808.251 They failed, however, to arrive at a just and lasting 
agreement on slavery and other related issues like the procedures for 
determining whether slavery would be legal in new western territory.252 
Instead, the Constitution’s drafters left the resolution of this issue to 
later generations.253 Despite later attempts at political compromise, 
these subsequent generations could not resolve the issue, which led to 
increasing social strife, and eventually, a long and bloody civil war.254 
                                                                                                                     
 As the American example illustrates, the Arab Spring nations must 
attempt to adequately resolve the difficult issues they face rather than 
leave them to future generations and allow for widespread social and 
political unrest.255 The role of Islamic law in state affairs is one such is-
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sue with competing visions.256 With numerous contending interpreta-
tions of not only the role, but the form and substance of Islamic law, this 
has the potential to be a very divisive issue that must be addressed.257 
 Different Arab nations have dealt with the place of Islamic law in 
government very differently—for example, Turkey and Iran represent 
opposite extremes.258 Since its Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran’s legal 
system has been based on the Shiite version of Sharia law.259 The revo-
lutionaries’ institution of this system represented a conscious shift to 
Islamic law as it displaced a modern system of secular law established by 
the previous regime.260 The laws in Iran’s Islamic system are derived 
from the Quran, hadith (tradition), ijma (the consensus of the jurists), 
and aql (reason).261 This legal system has been harsh in practice and it 
often produces results in conflict with more liberal notions of human 
rights.262 With the displacement of a modern secular system for this 
Islamic system of heavy reliance on the Quran, scholars’ interpretations 
thereof, and Islamic tradition, post-revolutionary Iran adopted a legal 
system based extensively on Islamic law.263 
 By contrast, Turkey—another Muslim majority nation—embraces 
secularism and requires a strict separation between religion and state 
institutions.264 Turkey’s adoption of secular principles in everything 
from law and government to education leaves virtually no role for Is-
lamic law in the workings of the state.265 To be sure, Turkey remains an 
overwhelmingly Muslim majority nation, with about ninety-nine per-
cent of the population identifying as Muslims.266 Nevertheless, they 
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have made a constitutional decision to aspire to secularism and struc-
ture their culture of constitutionalism accordingly.267 
 Other nations fall in between these two extremes of Iran and Tur-
key, incorporating some elements of Islamic law into the state, yet pre-
serving a role for other law as well.268 For example, Libya has included 
a constitutional provision maintaining Islamic law as the basis for the 
laws,269 but maintains that it will be a “moderate Muslim nation.”270 
Thus, there is a wide range of ways to approach the issue of Islamic law 
in state affairs, and the Arab Spring nations must adopt an approach 
that can mobilize broad popular support for their chosen fundamental 
principles.271 
 Another important pitfall to avoid is engaging in a campaign of 
vindictive persecution and corrective justice for political supporters of 
the former regime.272 To be sure, officials of the old regime that com-
mitted crimes against their people or violated human rights should be 
brought to justice at trial.273 Indeed, both the International Criminal 
Court and the Libyans seek to try Said al-Islam Gaddafi for his role in 
perpetuating human rights violations in response to the Libyan upris-
ing; Hosni Mubarak was tried and sentenced to life in prison for his 
response to the Egyptian Protestors.274 Even so, some revolutionaries 
may seek to impose sanctions for individuals’ past political affiliations 
or denigrate their roles in the future society, rather than focus on the 
constitutional challenge ahead.275 
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 Such corrective justice for many otherwise innocent citizens is 
counter-productive, harmful to social stability, and should be avoided in 
constructing the future state.276 After the appropriate crimes have been 
tried, it is much more effective for the nation to focus on future consti-
tutional development.277 Indeed, as Bruce Ackerman stated, “corrective 
justice is concerned with the past and the need to punish . . . misdeeds; 
constitutionalism faces the future and the need to make it unlike the 
past.”278 
 The Iraqi experience provides instructive wisdom on this matter, 
though subject to greater international influence and in a less revolu-
tionary setting.279 After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam 
Hussein in 2003, the new Iraqi government instituted a policy of “de-
Baathification” to erase all traces of Hussein’s regime and his Baath 
party in government.280 This prevented most people associated with the 
Baath political party and Hussein’s regime from participating in elec-
tions and the new government.281 
 De-Baathification had three major failings pertinent to analyzing 
nascent constitutionalism.282 First, many of the people who were mem-
bers or supporters of the Baath party during Hussein’s reign partici-
pated out of fear, or to keep their jobs and benefits for their families.283 
These otherwise innocent people were unnecessarily ostracized and 
punished in the post-Hussein era.284 Second, this ostracism led to un-
necessary divisiveness, often along religious lines, as most former Baath 
party supporters were Sunnis who could not participate in elections.285 
This division led other Sunnis to boycott subsequent elections in 2005, 
leading to disproportionate representation of Shia and Kurd ethnic 
groups and an unstable political climate.286 These divisions diverted Iraq 
from its main task of building a solid constitutional foundation for the 
future of the state.287 The third way in which de-Baathification failed 
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Iraq’s democratic transition is evident in that many former Baath party 
members were important members of society as educators and govern-
ment administrators.288 Their ostracism deprived Iraq of many well-
educated, skilled professionals during a period vital to rebuilding their 
nation, and may have contributed to the slow pace of its recovery.289 
 The Iraqi experience provides much wisdom on the detriments of 
corrective justice in designing a new constitutional order.290 Instead of 
focusing the limited post-revolutionary political capital on the devel-
opment of the future state, Iraqis and their American administrators 
focused on vindictive and divisive retribution, squandering the poten-
tial of the moment and harming the future of Iraq.291 Indeed, Egypt 
has taken strides in recognizing and avoiding this problem by pardon-
ing past crimes committed in furtherance of the revolution, and all 
three Arab Spring nations should continue on this path.292 As Egypt 
seemingly recognizes, any nation seeking to erect a new constitutional 
culture after a dramatic regime change should focus its energies on the 
progress of the future state, and should remember that “[c]onstitu-
tional creation unites; corrective justice divides.”293 
 Thus, nations engaged in the process of post-revolutionary consti-
tutional design—such as post-Arab Spring Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt— 
must address both the difficult and divisive issues present in their poli-
tics, and avoid the problems of corrective justice.294 Avoiding these two 
pitfalls is helpful in moving the nation forward into a new stable social 
and political culture, rather than needlessly focusing limited energies 
on the past.295 
Conclusion 
 In the recent Arab Spring, the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
successfully toppled their old regimes and are now faced with the prob-
lems and promise of concretizing their revolutions in new constitutional 
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orders. Generally, when facing this task of writing post-revolutionary 
constitutions, drafters should 1) ensure the aspirational goals are repre-
sentative of a collective national identity, 2) articulate constitutional as-
pirations that are within the capabilities of the state and tailored nar-
rowly enough to be practically achievable, 3) provide functional 
constitutional provisions that both establish and check institutions so 
they possess powers appropriate to fulfill the nation’s aspirations, but 
not so broad that they undermine those aspirations, 4) address difficult 
national issues to avoid passing responsibility to future generations and 
perpetuating the social strife emanating from debate on the issue, and 
5) avoid widespread corrective justice aimed indiscriminately against all 
citizens who supported the old regime. 
 These considerations are by no means exhaustive, and there are 
certainly other issues, both abstract and specific, to address when draft-
ing a new national constitution. Nevertheless, employing these univer-
sal criteria to the particular normative decisions ahead can help ad-
dress difficult national issues, such as the role of Islamic law in state 
affairs or the proper scope of human rights protections. As demon-
strated from examples in both history and theory, considering these 
criteria to address concerns in the constitutional process can be helpful 
to break from the constitutional hypocrisies of old regimes, entrench 
the peoples’ revolutionary aspirations, and provide social stability as 
peoples become habituated to their new national constitutional cul-
tures. Accordingly, the drafters of the post-Arab Spring constitutions in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya should be mindful of these issues so their es-
tablished democracies may last for years to come. 
